Steve Bannon’s friendship circle.

Steve Bannon, leading American white supremacist, who describes himself as “a populist and economic nationalist”, and is neutrally described by The Guardian as a “former Trump adviser” (Rowena Mason & Heather Stewart, ‘Rees- Mogg met former Trump adviser to talk tactics’, The Guardian 02 12 2017) has visited the UK to talk to old friends, like UKIP’s Nigel Farage, and new friends, like Tory MP, Rees-Mogg, who astonishingly described him as “an interesting man to have met” (ibid.). A second, as yet unnamed Tory MP, was also in the mix. This is alarming news.

Breitbart London editor and former chief of staff to Farage, Raheem Kassam, brokered the meeting (ibid). These ambitious rich men have plans for us: Kassam declared that “Brexit and the election of President Trump were inextricably linked, so the discussions focused on how we move forward with winning for the conservative movements on both sides of the pond” (ibid.). The significant way in which these events were inextricably linked was that they were largely funded and data-driven by the same individuals and organisations (Cambridge Analytica and Aggregate IQ), with the same extremist intent.

These men do not represent mere “conservative movements”, but fundamentalist Christian, white supremacist goals: Bannon’s self-declared ”brand of economic nationalism”, like Trump, purports to put the interests of ordinary people first” (ibid.). These men have the funds, determination and sense of entitlement to pursue their vanity projects. They will not sink without trace before causing further democratic upheaval and social damage. Those who oppose the white supremacist agenda must work to bury them and their malign purposes as best we can.

val walsh / 06 12 2017

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The electoral funding of the UK ‘Brexit’ campaigns: a democratic scandal?

Aggregate IQ is described as ”a small Canadian firm, specializing in social media marketing, considered as instrumental in helping the Leave campaign win” (Jessica Elgot & David Pegg, ‘Electoral Commission documents reveal more details on Vote Leave donations’. The Guardian, 21 11 2017).

Sounds innocent enough: “small” (not corporate), Canadian (not Russian), but given the size of its actual donations (monetary and data), it could be considered a determining factor in the Leave campaign. The various Leave campaign groups (including the DUP campaign) admitted that Aggregate IQ initiated these donations: ‘they found us, we didn’t find them”. Who the donors were and what politics lay behind the donations was never questioned.

The Leave campaign groups may not have known who they were, why they wanted to be involved, or what their larger purpose was, but Aggregate IQ certainly did. Alongside Cambridge Analytica, Aggregate IQ is part of white supremacist, Robert Mercer’s secretive stable of influence (also active in the Trump campaign).

In addition to objections to the provenance of said donors and their political motives, and the extent to which these donations constituted illegal interference in UK democracy, there is also the question of the legality of these massive donations, if they tipped the Leave campaign over its legal electoral funding limit.

A third surely clinching factor is that “Donors from outside the UK and Gibraltar were impermissible donors for referendum campaigning” (Holly Watt, ‘Electoral Commission to investigate Arron Banks’ Brexit donations’. The Guardian, 11 11 2017). But the apparent lethargy of the Electoral Commission compounds the situation, as it begins to look like culpable negligence. Months down the line, evidence of impropriety, illegality, political manipulation and corruption are nowhere near being scrutinised appropriately. Looks like a cover up.

val walsh / 24 11 2017

‘Brexit’ and the UK Labour party.

The EU referendum, rather than being a democratic act, was a dishonest political manoeuvre by former Tory prime minister, David Cameron, ostensibly to resolve longstanding internal divisions within his party re the EU. There was no effort to provide relevant and adequate objective information about what exiting the EU would entail. In fact, it is now clear the ‘Brexit’ campaigners had, and still have, no idea. Evidence about what actually happens, about the role of the UK within the EU and vice versa, is irrelevant to Tory politicians embroiled in the internal power struggles within their party or white supremacists who see chaos as a political strategy. (See ‘Whose “cry of pain”? Whose rage? Whose agenda?’ in category Commentary 2017 at togetherfornow.wordpress.com)

The ‘Brexit’ campaigns were funded (and furnished with data) by Robert Mercer‘s Cambridge Analytica and Aggregate IQ, part of a network of rich, white supremacists, which includes Steve Bannon, Donald Trump and Nigel Farage. It has since been acknowledged that the ‘Brexit’ campaign was fuelled by outright lies and misinformation, and was driven by a political desire to inflame distrust and hatred towards ‘foreigners’, refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and Muslims. The nature of the funding and data provision emerged after the referendum result. It raises questions not just about its impact on voters’ behaviour, but about its electoral legality.

Although there had been no electoral guidance as to what % vote should count as a ‘winning’ result for such a major constitutional, economic, political and cultural change (e.g. 60%?), the referendum result, at 48:52, was hailed by the MSM, the media and the Labour party as the ‘will of the people’, which had to be obeyed. However, Prime Minister May (mis)judged that she could secure a more solid mandate for her own role as PM (unelected as she was by either her party or the country), by calling a snap general election, when she expected to destroy the Labour party, under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, as an electoral force. As a result of her impulsive act and the way in which she conducted her campaign, she lost what little mandate she had, and her party’s overall majority was slashed. This result can fairly be seen as reflecting the democratic will of the people, especially as we had all been warned off voting for Labour by both politicians and media.

As evidence unfurls from all corners of civil and professional society, business, industry, higher education, the NHS and the unions, it becomes clearer by the day, that there can be no such thing as a ‘good ‘Brexit’ (hard or soft): legally, economically or culturally. On the basis of the evidence so far, what we face are degrees of catastrophic self harm as a society, and even, as one EU politician put it recently, “mutually assured destruction” between the UK and the EU.

So, in the light of this new evidence, this emerging reality/horror show, isn’t it time for the UK Labour party to spell out the above, and take up the most recent mandate, which confirmed opposition to Tory Austerity politics and May’s strident ‘Brexit’ rhetoric? Time to be bold, rather than repeating, as Labour MP Emily Thornberry had to on Question Time (BBC1, 16 11 2017), that “we are a democratic party and must obey the referendum result and work to get the best possible deal for the country”.

This statement may obey the rules of grammar, but it flies in the face of sense and meaning and logic. As well as what we urgently need now from Labour politicians: the political will to do what is best for our country and all its peoples, without sacrificing any of those made vulnerable by Tory manoeuvres.

val walsh / 17 11 2011

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

Whose “cry of pain”? Whose anger? Whose agenda?

Jonathan Freedland highlights “the anger fuelling both” the election of Trump as POTUS, and the ‘Brexit’ vote in the UK. While acknowledging the significance of bedrock support from affluent voters in both countries for the electoral outcomes, “for the sake of argument”, he writes, “let’s focus on the demographic regarded as decisive: the white voters of those small towns left behind by globalization, if not modernity itself” (Freedland, ’We’ll never stop Brexit and Trump till we address the anger fuelling both’, The Guardian, 11 11 2017). [Emphasis added.]

In addition to economic anxiety, he cites the importance of race and identity, “specifically the beleaguered sense of white identity” (ibid.) illuminated by Gary Younge’s C4 documentary (09 11 2017), Angry, White and American. In the UK:

“The big leave vote in so many traditionally Labour seats was also read as a cry of pain from industrial towns abandoned and left derelict, with few or bad jobs, stagnant wages and crumbling public services” (ibid.).

But, he adds: “identity, immigration, loss, nostalgia, a sense of reduced status, and alienation from the country taking shape around them – all these played their part as well” (ibid.). So “first we need to address the situation that led our fellow Britons to make that decision” (ibid.). [Emphasis added.] But the “bedrock support from affluent voters” for ‘Brexit’ is not raised as part of “this situation”, as an issue triggering disbelief or disapproval, or needing explanation. And it has not been “read as a cry of pain”. This implies that the behaviour of affluent voters was rational and sensible. . . and cannot be blamed on our political parties or the media.

Freedland ignores other significant contributing factors. Both the ‘Brexit’ campaign and the campaign to elect Trump were heavily financed: to understand the electoral results, we must follow the money, rather than ignore it. These votes were largely paid for (bought?) by Robert Mercer’s Cambridge Analytica and Aggregate IQ data organisations. Every ‘Brexit’ campaign in the UK, including the DUP campaign, received substantial funds and/or data from his organisations, in order to target categories of voters with persuasive ‘information’. Mercer’s organisations have links to Nigel Farage, Liam Fox’s ‘Atlantic Bridge’ organisation, Steve Bannon (Trump’s former adviser) and Vladimir Putin, for example. This is an Alt Right network. (Alt Right is code for white supremacist and is meant to replace references to the KKK or to fascism.) The legality or otherwise of this external electoral funding in the UK, and how it influenced voters’ decisions, awaits investigation and legal redress. The delay with this will no doubt guarantee that these crimes against democracy fall foul of the time limits rule, and no action is taken.

The facts about the referendum funding in the UK are not peripheral to understanding the “situation” (Freedland’s term) and the electoral outcome. Indeed they undermine the neat idea of a responsible and decisive ”demographic” (Freedland’s term) as some ‘natural fact’. Similarly, the act of “reading” the outcome “as a cry of pain” (Freedland’s terms) locates its meaning securely within this (media-defined) demographic: characterising it as both a victim voice and as (angry) protest (against politics itself). The views, values and political ambitions of those very rich and powerful rightwing men funding the campaigns remain hidden from view and unexamined. This, I suggest, amounts to a distortion in our understanding of what was going on and why, and in turn, how these forces can be exposed and resisted.

For the MSM to ignore the way the campaigns were funded and how data was used to target voters, is lazy journalism, and depoliticizes what was a highly political process of manipulation activated (in relative secrecy) by the far right. It removes a key (determining?) feature of the prevailing political context from scrutiny, in our effort to understand “the situation that led our fellow Britons to make that decision” (ibid.).

Religious fanatics with funds: political extremists with apocalypse on their historical agenda.
In interview with Paul Laity, black American novelist and script writer, Attica Locke, describes how her new crime novel, Bluebird, Bluebird, was instantly affected by Trump’s election (‘”When Trump was elected, overnight my book changed. I didn’t alter a word”’. The Guardian, 16 09 2107). 

“The plot revolves around murders with a connection to the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas: ‘Are   you talking about the Klan?’ her hero, Darren Matthews, is asked. ‘Worse,’ he replies: ‘It’s the Klan with money and semi-automatic weapons’” (cited Laity, ibid.).

Steve Bannon’s links with Robert Mercer and other white supremacists have been known for some time, as well as Mercer’s role in the funding of both ‘Brexit’ and Trump, and Bannon’s role running the far Right website, Breitbart. That the links encompass the KKK, the Alt Right, etc., became more obvious as Trump’s election acted to validate the views of the extreme Right, and public racism immediately started to soar in both countries in the wake of both ‘Brexit’ and Trump’s victory.

In the US, Attica Locke, born in Houston, Texas, saw Trump’s victory “through the lens of race”, as a “backlash” to Obama’ (cited Laity, ibid.). ‘“Everything about Trump has led to *Charlottesville”, she tweeted’ (ibid.). In the UK, a Muslim office worker, whose family has been in the UK for 60 years, writes anonymously of experiencing racism in the 1980s, and how “Things got better and were meant to carry on getting better. Sadly the abuse is back. . . . As a human, I’m horrified and disgusted. As a Muslim, I’m mostly frightened. How did we get here?” (‘What I’m really thinking. The Muslim office worker’, The Guardian Weekend, 11 11 2017). Well, one prominent factor has been a dominant (i.e. well funded) political narrative that set out to inflame and stage-manage people’s sense of difference and discontent. Nigel Farage, the UK’s most vociferous and prominent campaigner for getting the UK out of the EU, openly claims his 25 years doing this as “his life’s work”.

While his US friend Steve Bannon’s extremist views and influence on Trump, and his short-lived membership of Trump’s inner circle in government, are not secrets, Andrew Brown’s recent long essay, ‘The war against Pope Francis’ (The Guardian, 28 10 2017) provides a sharp reminder of the role of Bannon’s rightwing Catholicism for his politics, and just how dangerous a political player he could still be.

After an investigation commissioned by Pope Benedict in 2012, Pope Francis, “whose modesty and humility have made him a popular figure around the world’ (Brown, ibid.), took action and purged a Vatican group “accused of combining increasingly extreme rightwing politics with a devotion to the Latin Mass” (Brown, ibid.). The next year, Francis sacked Cardinal Burke from his powerful job in the Vatican’s internal court system (ibid.). “By doing so”, Brown notes, “he made an implacable enemy”. The relevance of these events for the concerns of this commentary, are glimpsed in Brown’s summary of Burke’s style and influence:

“Burke, a bulky American given to lace-embroidered robes and (on formal occasions) a   ceremonial scarlet cape so long it needs pageboys to carry its trailing end, was one of the most conspicuous reactionaries in the Vatican. In manner and doctrine, he represents a long tradition of heavyweight American power brokers of white ethnic Catholicism. . . . . Cardinal Burke’s combination of anti-communism, ethnic pride and hatred of feminism has nurtured a succession of prominent rightwing lay figures in the US, from Pat Buchanan through Bill O’Reilly and Steve Bannon, alongside lesser-known Catholic intellectuals such as Michael Novak, who have shilled untiringly for US wars in the Middle East and the Republican understanding of free markets “ (Brown, ibid.). [Emphasis added.]

Brown continues:

“It was Cardinal Burke who invited Bannon to address a conference in the Vatican, via video link, in 2014. Bannon’s speech was apocalyptic, incoherent and historically eccentric. But there was no mistaking the urgency of his summons to a holy war: the second world war, he said, had been “the Judeo-Christian west versus atheists’, and now civilization was ‘at the beginning stages of a global war against Islamic fascism. . . a very brutal and bloody conflict. . . . that will completely eradicate everything that we’ve been bequeathed over the last 2,000, 2,5000 years. . . . if the people in the church, do not . . . fight for our beliefs against this new barbarity that’s starting’”. [Emphasis added.]

Compare Bannon’s speech with the words of black American writer, novelist and civil rights activist, James Baldwin, cited by Pankaj Mishra (‘The war we don’t remember’, The Guardian, 11 11 2017).

“We can no longer discount the ‘terrible probability’ James Baldwin once described: that the winners of history, ‘struggling to hold on to what they have stolen from their captives, and unable to look into their mirror, will precipitate a chaos throughout the world which, if it does not bring life on this planet to an end, will bring about a racial war such as the world has never seen'”.

While the late, great Baldwin’s perceptive and chilling words were offered as a warning, Bannon’s apocalyptic rant in 2014 was meant as an incitement: i.e. ‘Bring it on’. There’s no lack of ambition behind these rich white men’s ferocious campaigns.

Religious fanatics with funds, political extremists with racism and purity on their obsessive minds, laced with misogyny and anti-feminism, suddenly feel free to take to the world stage, and exert their influence. This is the fascist package. Smiling, be-suited, unleashed, and busy about their historical mission, they promote chaos, the destruction of democracy as a political model, and the ‘return’ of white (male) supremacy. This is big, as Mishra notes:

“The white nationalists have junked the old rhetoric of liberal internationalism, the preferred language of the western political and media establishment for decades. Instead of claiming to make the world safe for democracy, they nakedly assert the cultural unity of the white race against an existential threat posed by swarthy foreigners, whether these are citizens, immigrants, refugees, asylum-seekers or terrorists” (Mishra, ibid.).

Watch and listen to Alt Right’s Richard Spencer in smiling, incendiary mode in Gary Younge’s Angry, White and American (C4, 09 11 2017), as he attempts (as a [deluded] white American male) to explain and justify his white nationalism, his white supremacist views, and his own consequent superiority as a white male, to Younge, an outstanding, award-winning, black British journalist, who lived and worked as a journalist in the US for 12 years, and has an American wife and children.

End note.
Do you feel their pain? Do you feel their anger? Do you understand their methods and their agenda?

Their desire and power to influence minds and shape politics worldwide for their burning ideological and personal purposes?

Pope Francis, though elderly and frail, took up the challenge. Politicians and the MSM would do well to follow his example, and be brave: help expose, challenge, regulate and reduce the power of these demotic, anti democratic agencies and individuals, rather than concentrating their bewilderment, frustration and analysis exclusively on those Trump supporters in the US and ‘Brexit’ voters in the UK, living in de-industrialised areas.

val walsh / 13 11 2017

Journalists and writers cited:
James Baldwin
Andrew Brown
Jonathan Freedland
Paul Laity
Attica Locke
Pankaj Mishra
Gary Younge.

 

 

 

 

Understanding Anorexia: The politics of women’s mental health.

  • Louis Theroux: Talking to Anorexia (BBC2, 29 10 2107)
  • The ‘invisible’ and disappearing female body
  • Whose power?
  • The marginalization of feminist-inspired women-only practice and culture.

There is something both symbolic and literal about anorexia, a condition identified by its signs and symptoms only once these have gained visible momentum: loss of appetite (for food, life and living), rapid weight loss, a sense of powerlessness, physical frailty, often depression, and the highest death rate for any ‘mental illness’.

Louis Theroux: Talking to Anorexia (BBC2, 29 10 2017).
This is, like his other investigations of ‘difficult’ or disturbing human subjects, sensitive, thoughtful, probing and shocking. The camera shows the visible evidence of anorexia (the way it reduces and reshapes women’s bodies), and Theroux in its presence, in institutions providing mental health services, in the women’s familial environments and in personal interviews. Theroux doesn’t emote and is verbally gentle and non judgemental. At the same time, faced with these just-about-alive, emaciated bodies, Theroux’s eyes and face, ostensibly inscrutable, nonetheless convey his sense of disturbance and concern, and his own powerlessness, even as he and his crew witness and document the women’s experience of anorexia.

The ‘invisible’ and disappearing female body.
Anorexia is literally a visible shrinking and drying up: of body tissue and size, as well as social horizons. It is the reduction, even removal, of fat and muscle, for example curves and breasts, as well as organ function, such as menstruation. It is a hollowing out, physically, mentally and emotionally, and can be understood as an effort to become both less visible (increasingly skeletal) and the centre of attention/care (as a visibly undernourished, skeletal body that indisputably signals ‘distress’, crisis, lack, need).

The onset of anorexia is usually in the early/mid teens, a period of pivotal sexual and social transition from girl to woman. In Theroux’s report, the ‘accepted’ discourse applied to anorexia revolves around the concepts of ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’. These gender-neutral medical norms obliterate the reality of anorexia in girls and women. There is no such thing as ‘gender-neutral’ health for girls and women, especially when it is the visible body that is the terrain on which the girl or woman’s trauma is (dis)played.

Given these circumstances, how do we define ‘healthy’ for a woman? In terms of organ function, physical development, the absence of ‘disease’? In terms of conformity to social norms regarding gender and sexuality: an absence of ‘deviance’? But we know that conformity to sexist, racist and misogynist social norms can be very damaging for a girl or woman, in terms of her sense of self, her sexual and social confidence and wellbeing. Anorexia speaks to these pressures.

The shrinking and drying up that takes place during anorexia is of the female body: it is a de-sexing. It can be seen as a literal withdrawal/denial of ‘femininity’ (which is a social and heterosexual category); a refusal to become or be a woman: to be “attractive”, as one of the women interviewed put it (which is a social and heterosexual category). The oldest woman interviewed (63) explains it cheerfully as “not wanting to grow up, wanting to stay a child”. This avoidance suggests that the ‘threat’ of adult sexual intimacy is experienced as coercive and dangerous. And if you choose not to perform heterosexual femininity, by starving your female body, you can avoid both danger and ‘failure’. These are clearly not ‘medical’ conditions or problems.

A report by the then government’s Women’s Unit in 2000, found that “Inside, outside and beyond, young men and women are under continuing pressure to conform to traditional behaviour” (Will Woodward, ‘Gender stereotypes still hamper young’, The Guardian. 20 09 2000). 17 years later, in the age of the internet and expanding sexualisation in every corner of UK society, and widespread sexual harassment and violence against women and girls, this problem looks worse.

The Harvey Weinstein scandal in the US and the UK, which unleashed accusations of sexual harassment and rape that range over a period of 30 years or so, has been followed by the eruption of similar testimony about the ‘inappropriate’ (i.e. sexist, invasive, abusive, violent) behaviour of senior men in the UK parliament towards women, particularly young women. (See earlier commentaries, ‘Sexism and activism: What’s the problem?’ and ‘Thinking through “sexism”: Reflections on the challenge for the “Left” (and willing others)’, both written over a period of weeks in 2012 and posted in category Essays 2013 at togetherfornow.wordpress.com)

Hadley Freeman summarises a culture that has endured unimpeded for way too long:

“By the time harassment stories were emerging from journalism, politics, the arts, it          felt like maybe this wasn’t about a single industry, a few bad apples here and there.         This is about men. Men harassing women, men dismissing women who say they’ve      been harassed and now men bleating that they don’t know how to behave around             women today, because not inserting sexualised banter into every conversation they            have with women is apparently too difficult a concept for them to handle” (‘The       evidence is mounting – a man’s place is in the home’. The Guardian Weekend, 04 11     2017).

Darren Jones, the 30-year-old Labour MP for Bristol North West, suggested in parliament: “It shouldn’t be hard for MPs to moderate their behaviour” (cited Heather Stewart, ‘How the drip of allegations turned into a torrent inundating Westminster’, The Guardian, 04 11 2017). He advised:

“It’s very easy to find out if someone’s interested in you without assaulting them: you just ask them; you don’t need to send them creepy text messages or press your groin         against them” (ibid.).

What Jones misses in his succinct recommendation, is that this problematic behaviour is not about sex (mutual sexual attraction and the possibility of dating), but the routine abuse of power and male dominance by heterosexual men. Is girls’ and women’s anorexia a response to this pervasive culture of sexual harassment, abuse and violation?

Whose power?
Sometimes the girl or woman knows and is willing to name the trigger for her anorexia. There are glimpses in Theroux’s report: for example, the pressure on a girl/young woman of religious expectations of marriage and children as a duty; the prospect of a forced /arranged marriage; early relational/sexual rejection; bullying or abuse at school.

“A report published a year ago by MPs on the women and equalities committee             revealed shocking levels of sexual abuse and harassment of schoolgirls, who                complained it was a daily part of life but was often dismissed as ‘banter’ by staff”         (Sally Weale, ‘Greening faces legal challenge over pupil-on-pupil sex abuse’, The   Guardian, 04 11 2017).

Solicitor, Louise Whitfield, highlights the lack of political attention being paid to this serious problem:

“Repeated promises of new guidance over the last year have not been fulfilled, and    every day dozens of schoolgirls are sexually harassed and assaulted without their               schools knowing how to handle it” (cited Weale, ibid.).

The above examples provide some idea of the social and cultural contexts/pressures that present a challenge to the mental health of girls and women in our society, including those living with anorexia. However, these may not be considered as part of therapeutic process. Food, on the other hand, figures prominently in the anorexia discourse.

Our primary experience of food/eating is as a social activity, an aspect of intimacy that nourishes us: we start out being fed, as nurture, by our primary carer (usually the mother, at her breast or in her arms). But food is more than essential fuel or nutrition. Reviewing food memoirs, columnist and food writer, Ruby Tandoh quotes Emily Nunn approvingly from her book, The Comfort Food Diaries (2017): “Food has become my touchstone for understanding what real love is”. Tandoh takes up this theme:

“Food pierces to the heart of identity, forging the stuff that makes the bodies and  bones   of us. . . . The people may be different, the flavours unusual or the places far-off, but the message – that food informs who we are, and how we love – stays true”      (‘A table shared’, The Guardian, 04 11 2017).

In the context of anorexia, this is a poignant observation. Anorexia is defined as an eating disorder (not psychosis), a term that rather makes light of its seriousness as a life-changing and life-threatening condition. It disrupts the model of food as nurture and the cultural values it embodies: eating becomes private, solitary, secret, feared and shameful, instead of a sustaining, guilt-free, sensuous pleasure, engaged in as part of human intimacy. It can also become a means of exercising power and control within familial relations, as Theroux’s report glimpses, with perhaps notable consequences for the mother/daughter dyad.

Anorexic process can create a fault-line in the mother/daughter dyad that goes beyond food, because anorexia models difference, implied opposition: that the daughter will not follow the mother’s example regarding heterosexuality / femininity / reproduction. This can constitute (and be experienced as) a rejection of the birth mother, as both a nurturing figure and as a role model, i.e. the means by which the daughter is inducted into normative femininity and its expectations. The mother may be experienced as an agent of social control, and therefore part of the ‘problem’/a trigger.

Anorexia can be therefore be understood as more than ‘disorder’: as a refusal to conform to social norms that require a girl/woman to embody heterosexual identity and male fantasy. This fear of, and aversion to, normative heterosexual responsibility/appearance, result in a closing off of options. It’s as if there is no perceived alternative, and starvation becomes a consuming and defiant distraction: imagined/experienced as power and control.

On the evidence of Theroux’s report, the emphasis of treatment is on stopping the symptoms: disciplinary regimes designed around improving and monitoring food intake (not necessarily appetite), so that the patient can be returned to “normal life”, as the lead therapist breezily summarizes. But there is no evidence of “normal life” being examined, or acknowledged as the source of the problem. (This would presumably be seen as ‘politics’ not healthcare.)

Theroux focuses on residential anorexia services (greatly diminished by Austerity cuts) in medical environments, promptly described by a couple of the women interviewed as “prison”. Treatment is coercive and strictly monitored. This disciplinary model appears to be a process of infantilisation rather than empowerment: guiding (or forcing) the anorexic daughter to become the obedient child, the unreflective ‘good girl’, who can accept ‘femininity’ and its consequences without throwing up. The punitive, disciplinary regime of the medical model reinforces a childlike status. “Do you want to get well?” is asked. “I want to get well” is uttered with varying degrees of conviction. But what does each party to this narrative mean by “well”? What, if any (shared?) meanings are in play?

The medical model of women’s mental health treats anorexia as a medical problem, a technical challenge, as opposed to considering the social determinants of anorexia, its causes and triggers. This inevitably institutes a parent/child hierarchy of victim and authority figure. There is no invitation to understand self and society, nor to achieve self care as self actualization, creative agency and social competence. Crucially, this institutionalised model works to ignore the role of powerful men and patriarchal values in the unravelling of girls’ and women’s mental health in contemporary society. (See footnote at end of this essay.)

Every girl and woman in society has to make her own accommodation with the potential conflict between self-determination and social conformity, between a functioning level of self respect as opposed to self loathing (the lack inculcated by all those industries selling   products to ‘cure’ girls’ and women’s [industry-defined] ‘deficiencies’ and ‘sexual imperfections’). Anorexia is perhaps the most extreme and complex of those accommodations: ‘normality’ experienced as trauma, triggers self harm, which leads to life-threatening frailty and vulnerability, mental confusion, and in many cases, death.

In a turbo consumer society in which girls and women are the centre of attention as means and end (as consumed and consumers), being a girl or woman can be a lonely and disturbing place if you do not have good friendship networks with other girls or women, and upbringing and education do not equip you to understand the social forces at work, relentlessly coercing you to ‘participate’ uncritically as a ‘girl’/woman in a market society that drives gender stereotypes as a basis for selling and profit. Defined as a ‘disease’ (a notch up from ‘eating disorder’?), anorexia requires/generates profitable pharmaceutical ‘solutions’, which in turn become legitimised and authorised by the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). So it’s big business.

The marginalisation of feminist-inspired, women-only therapeutic practices.
Self harm, such as anorexia, must be particularly disturbing for clinicians to deal with. It’s not like a rash or bruise or broken limb. More like protest, anger, rejection, revenge. Anorexia positions clinicians and therapists as gendered, sexual human beings, not just as professional practitioners and figures of authority. Practitioners may not be aware they are deploying gender-neutral concepts of ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ to frame anorexia as a medical condition, but in 2017 this cannot be viewed as incidental or an oversight. This gender-neutral narrative has become an institutionalized policy: a disciplinary practice (in both senses) that amounts to personal and professional displacement activity, its main function presumably being to enable practitioners to ‘manage’ their role and their relationship with their challenging and bewildering anorexic clients, without being reminded of what they have in common, for example, in terms of society and the social and sexual scripts on offer.

The medical model of mental health thus functions as a distancing device towards those in distress; and the “medicalisation of distress encourages us to see them as having a context-less ‘illness’” (John Read & Jacqui Dillon, ‘Creating evidence-based, effective and humane mental health services’ in Read & Dillon [2013] Models of Madness: Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches to Psychosis: 394).

As a society, as clinicians and therapists, are we identifying this dis-ease we call anorexia as ‘personal’ failure? Do we blame the individual for ‘embarking on’ such a destructive trajectory? Do institutional practices in turn punish her as a culprit? Why is there so much reluctance to scrutinize and challenge the ‘traditional’ social norms that act as obstacles to girls’ and women’s safety, confidence, creativity and ‘health’? Managerialism rules.

“The moral complexity and ambiguity that is inherent in the enterprise of policing        human conduct is neatly reduced to the morally neutral and more predictable activity     of managing a bodily disease” (M. Rapley et al 2011, De-Medicalising Misery: 4, cited John Read & Jacqui Dillon [2013]: 394).

Why is there so little political and professional acknowledgement of the accumulated evidence of women’s experiential testimony, feminist research and scholarship that already exists? Why have these experiential, analytical and critical women’s voices been so disregarded? The novelist, Carol Shields, provides a clue. The following is excerpted from a letter written by the narrator (mother/wife/writer) to Dennis Ford-Helpern, in Carol Shields’ complex and life-affirming, final novel (1996), Unless:

Ford-Helpern has written a book about moral problems, in which ‘All the problem-solvers in your examples are men, all fourteen’ (Shields: 219).  The narrator writes to protest, in the nicest way possible:  ‘I don’t think you intend to be discouraging in your book.  I think you have merely overlooked those who are routinely overlooked, that is to say half the world’s population’ (ibid: 220).  Unless is a book of multiple strands and meanings, one of which is what it means to be ‘real, ‘good’, ‘moral’, ‘sane’; and the conditions for and obstacles against these states of consciousness and being.  Shields offers us the means to explore ourselves, our world, in all our vulnerability, frailty, and strength.  We accompany her characters to the edge and beyond.  See also the work of Algerian-born, French writer, Marie Cardinal (1991; 1993; 1996).  The Words to Say It (1993) has been described as ‘world-renowned as the most important book ever written on the personal experience of psychoanalysis and the journey through therapy to recovery’ (The Women’s Press, 1996).

The women-only spaces, services and organisations, such as women’s refuges, domestic abuse services, Liverpool’s RASA (Rape and Sexual Abuse Centre), VAWG ( Violence Against Women and Girls) organisations, such as IMKAAN, a UK-based black feminist organization dedicated to addressing violence against women and girls, and women’s studies courses in colleges and universities, were developed as a result of feminist activism, research and analysis since the 1970s, explicitly and critically rooted in women’s lived experience of disadvantage: misogyny, racism, homophobia, poverty, subjugation, violence and despair. They openly articulate the importance of anti sexist, anti racist, anti lesbophobic practices supportive of women in our diversity, for example regarding social class, ethnicity, age, neurodiversity and ability. Feminist methodology is fundamental to overcoming fear, healing psychic wounds and achieving empowerment. (See ‘”Into the sunlight”: Gender, narrative, (mental) health. Resources for a missing conversation’ in category Conference Presentations 2005 at togetherfornow.wordpress.com)

A women’s mental health group in Liverpool, located within the statutory provider, Merseycare, brought together women from a range of services and sectors, as both service users and providers. Significantly, it called itself WWW: What Women Want. Over several years, it researched and produced powerful reports on a range of issues, giving voice to women’s experiences, sharing best practice and making recommendations to service funders and providers. In 2017 it was one of the many casualties of Tory Austerity cuts.

A user-led group of women and men that meets in Liverpool, significantly called, ReVision, continues to facilitate the sharing of experience, strategies and ideas, explicitly challenging the medical model of mental health. In both these groups, intellectual engagement joins with experiential sharing to supersede a ‘parent/child’, ‘victim’/disciplinary model of mental ‘disease’. This is in line with the work of ISPS (The International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis), and INTAR (The International Network Towards Alternatives and Recovery). (See ‘A shared “somatic crisis”: enough common ground?’, presented at the INTAR conference, Power to Communities: Healing Through Social Justice [25-27 06 2014]; posted in category Conference Presentations 2014 at togetherfornow.wordpress.com)

There is no evident intellectual dimension to the medicalised approach to anorexia. Treating the ‘disappearing’ woman as a child, reinforces her lack, rather than igniting desire and appetite. Yet it is possible to substitute disciplinary constraints as therapeutic practice, with a model based more in feminist-aware educational, therapeutic and creative practice. For example, by contrast, talking, reading, writing, drawing, singing and dancing variously feature in an environment that addresses the whole woman and her understanding of her context. Nor does treating anorexia as a medical problem appear to be a successful strategy, judging by the high remission rates and the average time taken to ‘recover’ (given as 7 years).

“A 200,000 strong study found that young people in the UK have the poorest mental wellbeing in the world, with the exception of Japan” (cited Moya Sarnev, ‘Campus confidential: the counsellors on the frontline of the student mental health crisis’, The Guardian Weekend, 28 10 2017). “ONS figures show that in the last 10 years, the number of student deaths by suicide has risen more than 50%” (ibid.). But as usual, these statistics are not disaggregated to make visible the different experience of women and men. And “The 2016 Hepi (Higher Education Policy Institute) report notes that in some institutions the funding for counselling services is less than £200,000. [The average pay for university vice-chancellors now exceeds £275000]” (ibid.).

While demand has grown across the country for mental health provision, and Tory rhetoric acknowledges the problem, services have been slashed by Tory governments since 2010. While demand has grown for women-only services over the years, these services have struggled to stay afloat in a political climate that has hardly eased its suspicion of women-only spaces and feminist initiatives and campaigns that seek, for example, to mitigate and heal the wounds inflicted on girls and women by heterosexual men’s sexual harassment, misogyny and violence: their unregulated gender-based power.

Yet there are young women students today who, offered mental health sessions that are “practical, positive and solution-focused” . . . with no suggestion of delving below the surface and into the past to explore where these problems might stem from, are not interested in therapy that might ask these sorts of question (Sarnev, ibid.): “I’m just interested in finding ways to deal with it, seeing if I can try to resolve it, rather than looking at why it started” (cited Sarnev).

This is an instrumental, problem-solving approach to mental health issues, which implicitly defines mental health as a technical challenge. Perhaps because of the ubiquity and power of hetero-patriarchal dominance in contemporary society, this may seem the ‘safer’ (i.e. least demanding, disturbing, disruptive) option, for both service user and therapist. A mutually acceptable pact. But in a neoliberal society, in which individualism and autonomy rule a market economy, girls and women (perhaps especially students) will be wary of identifying themselves as ‘victims’ in need of help: experienced as stigma, rather than as a political act, this can be seen as adding to their gendered disadvantage, rather than empowering them.

But in the context of a society seemingly determined to avoid confronting and articulating the politics of women’s mental health (i.e. our collective position and experience in society), this behavioural approach gets close to submission: a polite deferral of girls’ and women’s full and equal citizenship, not just as individuals, but as a political constituency with clout.

I have suggested that there are two (longstanding) limitations to the evidence presented in Theroux’s otherwise sensitive report, which together have significant consequences for our understanding of anorexia and its ‘treatment’: the acceptance of the medical model of women’s mental health as applied to anorexia; and the evident lack of feminist analysis and understanding within mental health services, which denotes a lack of feminist institutional presence and professional power, resulting in what could reasonably be described as culpable negligence and avoidable ignorance.

As a consequence, by politely displaying the evidence of anorexia in women’s lives through the lens of its official medicalisation, Theroux takes the MSM route, and avoids critical engagement with the evidence, and by extension, the politics of women’s mental health. The bestselling author on “race, fitting in and giving a voice to those without power”, Celeste Ng, asks:

“whether progressives who politely follow the rules yet give up nothing that really       costs will ever achieve meaningful change. The surface may appear smooth but         lurking problems will eventually rise: disruption is required for truths to be revealed” (cited in interview with Paul Laity, ‘”When you’re in a marginalized group, your existence is politicised for you”’, The Guardian, 04 11 2017). Emphasis added.

The disturbance we are ‘allowed’ by Theroux is mainly at the level of being positioned as appalled spectators: bystanders to a ‘context-less illness’, rather than having our own identities and lives thrown into the mix, thereby removing the protection of the ‘them’ and ‘us’ binary. But the social, cultural and political context in which we now view this report has been overturned: as I mentioned earlier, in the week of its screening, and since, UK society has erupted, forcing the issue of men’s predatory heterosexual behaviour and abusive power to the fore as never before.

The medical model of women’s mental health makes no sense (nor is it meant to): it is an act of denial regarding the role of men’s predatory heterosexual behaviour and society’s acceptance of a masculinity that seems to depend on the submission, subjugation and control of girls and women for its own ‘health’. Girls and women as collateral damage in the ‘war zone’ we call society, attests to a squalid and brutal inequality that no decent society should tolerate, and no political culture in 2017 should simply emulate, feign confusion – and then apologise for.

Footnote.
See, for example, a selection of unpublished letters to The Guardian at togetherfornow.wordpress.com: (02 07 2010) Opening a dialogue on rape, violence and gender [posted 19 09 2013]; (06 07 2011) Rape, violence and gender: the new normal? (posted 19 09 2013]; (07 04 2013) The Philpott case and the media: sensationalism, denial, obfuscation, irresponsibility. [posted 19 09 2013]; (17 05 2013) Daniel Cohn-Bendit: children of the ‘revolution’ [posted 19 09 2013]; (02 06 2013) Gender, violence and the media: free speech or irresponsible speech [posted 19 09 2013]; Anachronistic conduct [posted 21 01 2014]; Gender-neutral language ‘disappears’ men and masculinity [posted 20 04 2014]; Murder in a UK classroom [posted 02 05 2014]). There are other related posts in other categories since 2014.

val walsh / 07 11 2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The UK general election result (06 2017): Labour as a progressive alliance.

Labour MP, Clive Lewis and Green MP, Caroline Lucas, have made no secret of their hostility to Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour project; Lewis forecast “’an existential crisis” if [Labour] failed to embrace progressive alliances” (Matthew Weaver, ‘Tactical voting: Corbyn could have become PM in landslide’, The Guardian, 14 06 2017). But who are the (“frustrated”) “progressive voters” of which they speak in their most recent joint statement? And does the “best placed left-of-centre candidate” referred to by Compass, in its push for tactical voting and a progressive alliance, mean every candidate or voter who is not Tory-inclined can be identified as “progressive”?

Based on recent historical evidence, many do not see the Lib Dems, the SNP or the Greens as progressive, left-of-centre parties. And the GE result has brought a diminution of political heft and influence for all three. But certainly these small parties are all infinitely preferable political allies to the DUP, even given playwright James Graham’s cautionary reflections on what a hung parliament is likely to mean (‘A hung parliament? It’ll be the 70s again, and people will die’, The Guardian, 14 06 2017).

However, tactical voting in this GE did not find favour or success, as seen in Wells, Somerset (Steven Morris, ‘People went for security in the end’, The Guardian, 14 06 2017). Suddenly, across the country, people saw Labour as the most compelling and realistic repository of anti Austerity values. Conversations on doorsteps, street corners, trains and buses, in families, at political meetings and open air rallies, gave expression to this rejection of more of the same punitive authoritarianism, and a burgeoning desire to do better, be better together. Old and young discovered common ground. Confidence was forged. What followed – increased voter registration and turnout, and the size of the Labour vote in ‘unexpected’ places – was a form of civil and political disobedience.

At the same time, those of us venturing out beyond our own constituencies, to support Labour campaigns in seats identified by Momentum as Labour or Tory marginals, became aware that there were candidates being underfunded by LP HQ (see Dan Hancox, ’24 hour party people’, 14 06 2017, G2). And where Momentum could not fill that gap, there were negative outcomes for those candidates. This needs independent investigation.

But doesn’t Corbyn’s inclusive Labour campaign, conducted with passion and dignity, and the stunning GE result, show that the Labour party is now seen as the only serious repository, not just of hope, but of realisable economic, social, environmental and political transformation, which has not previously been on offer from any political party? So for Lewis and Lucus to warn (threaten?) the Labour leadership that “progressives will desert the party if they cannot see a change in the way politics is conducted” combines ignorance and arrogance.

To caution the leader, who has engendered the most open, honest and participatory political process the country has ever seen, and which has led to this Labour breakthrough, confirms that there is still a lurking desire within the Labour establishment, to denigrate Corbyn’s achievement as leader and to topple him in the name of a progressive alliance. By ‘progressive’, they seem to mean themselves, those who have actively opposed Corbyn’s Labour project of diversity, unity and campaigning, against the apparent odds, to put Labour back on the political map, not just as the largest political party in Europe, but as a radical and representative party, fuelled by a new participatory politics that has activated members and supporters, old and new.

The post election resistance and disbelief that Lewis and Lucas represent, mean they still don’t get it. They don’t welcome this opening up of our democracy, this people-powered campaign (as opposed to machine politics). They don’t see the unity of purpose, across so many social and cultural differences, that Labour’s unique campaign and astonishing result demonstrate. If they cannot see this electoral process and result as a new politics, is it perhaps because their part in it was so reluctant? Like the media George Monbiot castigates (‘The biggest losers? Not the Tories but the media, who missed the story’, The Guardian, 14 06 2017), Lewis and Lucas (and Compass?) missed the story. So instead of rejoicing, they feel gloom and a sense of defeat.

val walsh / 16 06 2017

[This is a slightly revised version of the letter sent to The Guardian, 15 06 2017.]

Personal, political and professional misjudgement. Being wrong, being sorry, being contrite. . . . in the aftermath of Jeremy Corbyn’s game-changing general election campaign.

Since the UK GE (08 06 2017), a number of MPs and media commentators (e.g. Louise Ellman, Lucy Powell, Polly Toynbee, Jonathan Freedland, Robert Peston), stating the obvious, have admitted they “underestimated” Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader, and his ability to inspire and steer a widespread and burgeoning campaign rooted in Labour values, based around a manifesto that addressed the circumstances, concerns, hopes and aspirations of all sections of our society, across differences of age, ethnicity, social class, dis/ability, gender, sexuality and geography.

Some (e.g. Owen Jones and Owen Smith) have gone so far as to explicitly apologise. But in the main, the expressions of approval at this extraordinary achievement fall short of acknowledgement of their own role since Corbyn was elected in 2015, in opposing and denigrating him and his supporters: they merely, they say, made a mistake. They now smile, many Labour MPs having achieved increased majorities on the back of Corbyn’s incredibly successful Labour campaign. And those they derided are also expected to smile, now we are all on the same winning side. Corbyn’s supporters are expected to overlook, for example, the damage the PLP inflicted on the Labour party by forcing a second leadership election, and sustaining hostilities and attempts at sabotage, throughout the period of Corbyn’s leadership.

But what will stay with Jeremy’s supporters is not the neoliberal ‘mistake’ of these MPs and commentators, in finding themselves on the wrong side of history. What will be remembered are their venomous bile, their relentless spite, aggression and contempt towards Jeremy and his supporters – possibly the worst personal, political and media attacks on a public figure, an elected MP, in living memory. Their seeming need to destroy, not just to disagree, was shocking. As well as instructive: exposing themselves to public scrutiny (intellectual and political). We know them better now.

As Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn never responded to or descended to, personal abuse, and there were those who saw this as ‘weakness’, a sign that he was not a proper leader, not ‘manly’ enough. Following his example, can we now move to outlaw extremist forms of communication in the pubic sphere – in politics and the media – where shouting, verbal dominance and mocking abuse seem to have been normalized as signs of ‘success’, the behaviour of a ‘winner’. Both Theresa May’s relentless personal abuse during the electoral campaign, and Jeremy Paxman’s loudmouthed recent media performance surely show us the way not to go if we are to engender the social and political conversations we need, to come together in respect rather than competition. These are the old ways. Parliament and the media need to learn from Jeremy Corbyn’s example and strength.

val walsh / 12 06 2017